6 min read

Social media activism — a lazy or powerful tool?

Social media is a powerful channel that can be used for the benefit of a community. However, this requires a mastery of social media, says Laura Põldma, who studied the role of social media in community activism in her bachelor’s thesis.

Creating a Facebook group for fighting against the closure of a hospital’s maternity ward and mobilizing a community with 3,000 members.
Initiating an online petition to prevent the opening of a limestone quarry and the discussion of “a war strategy” in a closed social media group.
Continuous content creation on the Facebook site of a small school to support the continuation of the school.

These are some examples of community activism in social media, which has been increasingly seen in Estonian public media in recent years. The internet is used not only by mass movements, but also by small community-based movements for whom social media offers the opportunity to express themselves both inside and outside of a local context[i]. The importance of social media as a networking tool is significant from the viewpoint of the internal dynamics of civic associations, as found by Tanel Vallimäe and Peeter Vihma, in an analysis of the results of a study conducted in 2019 by Tallinn University, the Institute of Baltic Studies, and Turu-uuringute AS, for evaluating the situation within Estonian civil society.[ii]

In the eyes of critics, on the other hand, online activism is simply slacktivism, an activity that can make people feel good, but has little effect on political decisions[iii]. So, how can social media activism be dealt with? Is it just an activity that distracts citizens from other, more efficient forms of participation? Or is social media a thermometer that enables the measurement of a community’s mood on a certain moment? And what about the opinion that being primarily active on social media and spreading one’s message there makes an initiative less serious?

In my bachelor’s thesis “The role of social media in community activism on the example of three conflict cases”, I studied the communicative aspects, specifically of the impact of social media on community activism from the point of view of mobilization and influencing activities in three cases: the Põlva Hospital Maternity Ward, the Lüganuse Limestone Quarry, and the Harmi Elementary School Discussions with initiative leaders as well as civil society experts – Hille Hinsberg and Martin Noorkõiv, highlighted several aspects that could help the 21^st century activist to understand the role of social media from a mobilization and impact perspective.

Make the community’s opinion visible. Social media gives a community a voice and makes their outrage visible. The leader in one case study found that social media has made civil society more widely perceived, and there are many different opinions in Estonia about how to organize coexistence. The resulting pluralism is good, but there is also a downside in using social media to make resentment visible – the multiplicity of opinions. As one leader put it: when there are so many opinions, people in decisive positions may feel that it is never possible to consider everyone’s opinion. However, this hampers the activities of civil society. In such an increasingly “tight market” traditional methods – both demonstrations with slogans and protest events in Facebook – will eventually devalue.

Converting support to real actions. Social media can be useful for mapping support: one leader felt that Facebook was a kind of score-card or thermometer – as it was not known, at first, whether the community was happy with the respective closure. FB provided excellent input for leaders to understand the mood of the community. At the same time, is it worth paying attention to whether the extent of support and the thousands of members who joined the Facebook group add the actual value to the initiative? How many of those who are active on Facebook, are ready to do something in real life? This question arose for the activists themselves as well. Online activism has been seen as “lazy” activism, which speaks to persons who do not find time to participate actively.[iv]

At the same time, in the case of the Põlva Hospital’s Maternity Ward, it can be seen that activism, in the form of joining the Facebook group, was also expressed in real-life activities. A large number of signatures were collected – over 9,000 – and the collection of signatures on paper was not initiated by the leaders, but by other members of the community. In conclusion, it all depends on what other methods are used – combining different channels may help compensate the negative aspects of another. But you should compare comparable things. Many people, who are activists in social media, did absolutely nothing for the community in the past.[v] So, online activism is still better than no participation at all.

The digital gap in the digital country. Social networks include the risk of exacerbating inequalities if social media users tend to be more technologically skilled and have a higher level of human, social, and economic capital.[vi] It is worth noting that if an initiative is only active on social media, it may exclude part of a community from the debate. Be it older people or those who have consciously chosen to stay away from social media.

At the same time, one may ask whether Estonia, which is (according to the 2019 report of the European Center for Policy Studies) the highest-ranked country in the European Union in terms of digital learning and has a high level of computer literacy[vii], should worry about the digital gap at all? Although the problem may not be as great as in other countries, it is reasonable to consider that certain groups are more difficult to reach through online channels. Consequently, the combination of different channels and tools is also relevant in the context of the digital gap. In addition to creating a Facebook group, you should also bring your messages to the media, organize face-to-face events and, if necessary, establish direct contacts.

The issue of credibility. If an activity is only taking place in social media, its influence diminishes and decision-makers may think: “let them discuss it somewhere on their own and live out their resentment, life goes on”. Indeed: do decision-makers perceive a discussion in a Facebook group as equivalent to, for example, an editorial in an all-Estonian daily newspaper or a face-to-face meeting? There is no risk of social media not being taken seriously – the channel itself matters less than whether the message is “highlighted” in the channel, and whether the platform is right for spreading that particular message, i.e., the general ability to format and package the message. [viii] The impact of a media article can sometimes be much smaller than that of a social media posting, and a large number of voters in a group is much more influential for decision-makers.[ix]

Lack of social media competence and poor division of roles. As mentioned, social media gives communities a voice. However, not everyone’s opinion is always constructive. If the use of social media is unreasoned with several members of the community making random postings, it may not leave the best impression about the initiative. It is not necessary to censor, but a prerequisite for the successful operation of social media is a well-thought division of roles. It is certainly worthwhile to observe the experiences and journeys of other communities, as this can provide important knowledge.

Echo chamber effect. In conflicting cases of community activism, how the activists perceive the counterparts, their opinions, and arguments is important. Unfortunately, the features of social media (such as the ease of removing people from your friends list) encourage the emergence of echo chambers.[x] The “common reality” becomes socially validated in the echo chamber and can strengthen people’s world views. [xi] An explicit worldview and passion for a topic also tend to be expressed in more active, and often more emotional, speech. Although heated debates help to mobilize people, public debates are increasingly too emotional, leading to polarization and to not pursuing the long-term goals of defending the interests of communities.[xii]

In the context of influencing and the echo chamber effect, it is important to understand community awareness of how what decisions are made – and what is the vision of other stakeholders, including decision-makers – directly affects the success of protection of interests. A situation can easily arise, in an echo chamber, wherein excessive emotionality hinders the formation of constructive argumentation, and therefore directly prevents successful participation in the discussion. A situation should be avoided where officials make decisions based on economic considerations but are hit by activists with very different “sticks”. The degree of emotionality should depend on the goal of the community: for organising a great popular movement it can be efficient, but overly aggressive action can make politicians angry and work against the community.[xiii]

The spiral of silence. According to the spiral of silence theory, people censor opinions that they assume are unpopular.[xiv] It is clear that the wider the message of a community is, the more people fit under that wider message. By becoming too polarized and extreme (facilitated by the echo chamber effect) a community may lose members, as common ground becomes smaller and smaller. At the same time, it has been pointed out that due to the disappearance of walls around social environments, every narrator must consider whether they either insult someone or smooth their message to a degree that it is no longer attractive to anyone.[xv] Here, each community must find the right balance – to involve as many from the community as possible, but without losing its uniqueness.

Laura Põldma defended her bachelor’s thesis “The role of social media in community activism on the example of three conflict cases” this year at the University of Tartu. The full paper is available in the UT Digital Archive DSpace.

[i] Ruiu, M., Ragnedda, M. (2017). Empowering local communities through collective grassroots actions: The case of “No Al Progetto Eleonora” in the Arborea District (OR, Sardinia). The Communication Review, 20(1), pg. 51. https://doi.org/10.1080/10714421.2016.127227

[ii] Vallimäe, P., Vihma, T. (2019). Eesti mittetulundusühingud ja koostöö. Riigikogu toimetised, 40, pg. 185. https://rito.riigikogu.ee/nr-40/eesti-mittetulundusuhingud-ja-koostoo/

[iii] Christensen, H. S. (2011). Political activities on the Internet: Slacktivism or political participation by other means. First Monday, 16(2), pg. 9. https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v16i2.3336

[iv] Cammaerts, B. (2015). Social media and activism. R. Mansell, P. Hwa (toim). The International Encyclopedia of Digital Communication and Society, pg. 7. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62090/1/Social_media_and.pdf

[v] Noorkõiv, M. (2021). Author’s interview in the framework of a bachelor’s thesis.

[vi] Valenzuela, S., Arriagada, A., Scherman, A. (2012). The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior: The Case of Chile. Journal of Communication, 62(2), pg. 13. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01635.x

[vii] Eesti on kõige digiõpihimulisem riik Euroopas. (2019). HITSA, 11. December. Kasutatud 02.02.2020, https://www.hitsa.ee/uudised-1/eesti-on-koige-digiopihimulisem-riik-euroopas

[viii] Hinsberg, H. (2020). Author’s interview in the framework of a bachelor’s thesis.

[ix] Noorkõiv, M. (2021). Author’s interview in the framework of a bachelor’s thesis.

[x] Greijdanus, H., Fernandes, C. A., Turner-Zwinkels, F., Honari, A., Roos, C.A., Rosenbusch, H., Postmes, T. (2020). The psychology of online activism and social movements: relations between online and offline collective action. Current Opinion in Psychology, 35, pg. 50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.03.003

[xi] Greijdanus, H., Fernandes, C. A., Turner-Zwinkels, F., Honari, A., Roos, C.A., Rosenbusch, H., Postmes, T. (2020). The psychology of online activism and social movements: relations between online and offline collective action. Current Opinion in Psychology, 35, pg. 50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.03.003

[xii][xii] Vallimäe, P., Vihma, T. (2019). Eesti mittetulundusühingud ja koostöö. Riigikogu toimetised, 40, pg. 182. https://rito.riigikogu.ee/nr-40/eesti-mittetulundusuhingud-ja-koostoo/

[xiii] Hinsberg, H., Noorkõiv, M. (2021). Author’s interviews in the framework of a bachelor’s thesis.

[xiv] Greijdanus, H., Fernandes, C. A., Turner-Zwinkels, F., Honari, A., Roos, C.A., Rosenbusch, H., Postmes, T. (2020). The psychology of online activism and social movements: relations between online and offline collective action. Current Opinion in Psychology, 35, pg. 50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.03.003

[xv] Viik, K. (2019). Konteksti häving sotsiaalmeedias. Postimees, 17. October. Used 11.01.2020, https://kultuur.err.ee/992749/kadi-viik-konteksti-having-sotsiaalmeedias

6 min read

META insights on Estonian local elections 2021

It is clear that the power dynamics in Estonian politics are changing, with the Centre Party’s strategy needing revision.

Estonia held its local elections with the final day of voting taking place on October 17^th and with more than 1000 councillors elected in 79 municipalities. These were one of the most significant local elections in recent history as the ruling party in Tallinn, the Centre Party (ALDE), lost its hold on the city council for the first time in more than a decade, having been kept short of the absolute majority of 40 seats in the 79-seat chamber. How will this exactly affect national politics – and especially the current coalition government between the centre-right Reform Party (ALDE) and the centre-left Centre Party – is to be seen in the coming weeks.

These were one of the most significant local elections in recent history as the ruling party (ALDE) lost its hold on the city council for the first time in more than a decade.

However, coupled with the Centre Party’s clear loss in their second key constituency of Narva, with also disappointing results in the cities of Tartu and Pärnu, the future of the Centre Party’s leadership might be contested, with ramifications in national politics. The former prime minister Jüri Ratas, also the chairman of the party, will have to provide for changes in strategy and team, to hold off contenders, as the general elections of 2023 are looming on the horizon and projecting the local election results onto the national level, the picture is not satisfactory.

Nationwide results

If arbitrarily summarized, the elections were won by the Centre Party with a small lead ahead of the various local electoral alliances. The latter are popular in local elections, especially in smaller municipalities, where national party affiliations matter less and often people of different party leanings coalesce into one candidate list, based on local political sympathies.

Party	2021 elections	2017 elections	Change, %-points
Centre Party (ALDE)	24.4%	27.3%	-2.9%
Electoral alliances	24.3%	27.2%	-2.9%
Reform Party (ALDE)	17.3%	19.5%	-2.2%
EKRE (ECR)	13.2%	6.7%	6.5%
Pro Patria (EPP)	8.4%	8%	0.4%
Eesti 200 (n/a)	6%	n/a	n/a
Social Democrats (PS)	5%	10.4%	-5.4%

Table 1. National vote share

The Capital City of Tallinn

Although the Centre Party increased its voter share in comparison to last local elections in 2017, they have to forfeit their one-party rule. This is due to the higher number of parties who made it above the 5% threshold. The modified d’Hondt system of electoral mechanics means that the votes that are casted for parties which wind up receiving less than the 5% threshold are divided among the successful parties with most of the votes tending to go to the election winner.

Party	2021 elections	2017 elections	Change, %-points
Centre Party (ALDE)	45.4%	44.4%	1%
Reform Party (ALDE)	17.8%	20.5%	-2.7%
EKRE (ECR)	9.5%	7%	2.5%
Eesti 200 (n/a)	9.5%	n/a	n/a
Social Democrats (PS)	7.5%	11%	-3.5%
Pro Patria (EPP)	7.1%	6.6%	0.5%

Table 2. Tallinn vote share

As can be seen from the vote share and the council seats (Table 2 and Table 3), the key component in current elections was the success of newcomer Eesti 200. The party was founded ahead of the last general elections in 2019 where they were unsuccessful in gaining seats in the parliament. However, the party continued its work and has now officially cemented themselves in Estonian politics with strong representations in the key cities of Tallinn and Tartu.

Party	2021 elections	2017 elections	Change
Centre Party (ALDE)	38, out of 79 seats	40, out of 79 seats	-2
Reform Party (ALDE)	15	18	-2
EKRE (ECR)	8	6	2
Eesti 200 (n/a)	7	n/a	n/a
Social Democrats (PS)	6	9	-3
Pro Patria (EPP)	5	5	0
Other	0	1	-1

Table 3. Tallinn council seats

In the coming days, the parties will launch coalition talks. The Centre Party will be most likely to try to secure a coalition with the Social Democrats, as this would be both ideologically the soundest and easiest to manage also from the point of view political chemistry. Another option would be to tie the knot with political newcomer Eesti200. However as a new, sort of a centrist, high-brow technocratic party, its demands on how the city should be run are from one perspective very sharp and from another, its real political philosophy is still so vague that it is hard for a partner to gauge long-term viability of co-operation.

Further takeaways

The second largest city of Tartu remains in the control of the prime minister’s Reform Party. This has been the stronghold of the party since the end of 1990s. However, as usual in Tartu, they must find a coalition partner, with the Social Democrats and Pro Patria looking like the most promising partners. The newcomer Eesti 200 is an unlikely candidate as they had made a lot of fuss about replacing the Reform Party altogether in the electoral campaign and the personal chemistry might not be there between the two parties.

The troubling situation might provoke [Jüri Ratas] into rash moves, destabilising the already embattled government.

Perhaps another one of the most notable outcomes of the local elections was the clear loss of the Centre Party in its second key constituency, the predominantly Russian-speaking city of Narva. This has been under the sole governance of the Centre Party for more than two decades. The weakened position of the Centre Party in Narva, as well as their clear losses in the other key cities of Pärnu and Tartu further mixes up the power dynamics in the national government, with the party leader Jüri Ratas on the defensive. The troubling situation might provoke him into rash moves, destabilising the already embattled government that has been struggling with the lagging vaccination drive.

The right-populist EKRE also consolidated some of its promising growth into results. The party which gained access into the parliament only in 2015 on the back of the EU immigration crisis as well as protest against national civil union legislation, has been growing its national party apparatus.

While the gains in many places were remarkable, then the party’s summarized results fell short of their own expectations. In the national polls that simulate general election support, they have been neck and neck with the leader, the Reform Party. However, EKRE’s local election results came in with just half of what the national polls had been promising, meaning that the party’s messaging – while appealing to many that are generally concerned about their lives and future – do not impact practical electoral behaviour to the same extent. Furthermore, the party, due to its extremist image, has still a hard time appealing to brand name candidates. Outside of the party leaders, very few names carry similar weight.

Summary

The next general elections take place in early 2023. While the Prime Minister’s Reform Party, despite of the difficulties of running a coherent COVID19 national strategy, seems to have gone through this test intact, it will be facing Eesti 200 as a serious challenge to some of its more liberal voters, especially in the bigger cities. Their concerns might be relieved only by the Centre Party’s relative weakness outside the capital city of Tallinn – taking into account also that many of the Centre Party’s non-citizen voters cannot vote in parliamentary elections. The rise of the right-populist EKRE, also seems to have made it through their first test, with the results indicating, that further normalization of the party’s core needs to take place to broaden support (i.e., mainstream messaging and stronger candidates).

Almost missing from the political map are the Social Democrats. Although in many places, their local party organizations were part of politically non-affiliated candidate lists, then their results in the bigger cities were still really disappointing for the party. Their search for new leadership and positioning, between the centre-right Reform Party, the centre-left Centre Party and yet non-ideological technocratic Eesti 200, continues without a solution in sight.

4 min read

Ott Lumi: Lobby — Hard To Regulate in Sauna

This article was first appeared in Äripäev on April 24, 2018.

In the case of lobbying, it is important to mark first of all that it is one of the areas of consultancy with, for example, around 25 000 people in Brussels and around 15 000 in Washington. Laws and regulations have an impact on a very wide range of business areas. At the top of the list you could list the food industry, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, IT, arms industry, classical industry, etc. Companies compete intensively and are usually influenced by the regulatory environment as one of the important factors.

Government relations experts and advisers are the people who know how regulations are made, who makes them and how to monitor and sometimes influence their development. Regulatory lobbying is therefore a very old profession. The problem is illegal lobbying. It is something that countries and nations have tried to regulate according to their contextual specificities. For example, our Minister of Justice (at the time Urmas Reinsalu – ed.) took the position that lobbying should be better regulated and promised to come up with ideas for doing so. The latest yearbook of the internal security service also speaks about covert lobbying and the importance of keeping all policy influencing activities in the open and public domain.

I am a government relations practitioner as well as a theorist. I am the author of Estonia’s first university lecture course on the subject and have written a few academic articles in the field. But first and foremost I am a practitioner of government relations. I have been advising companies on regulatory issues, both domestic and foreign, for a decade now. As a practitioner in the field, I believe that sensible regulation would undoubtedly be in the common interest of all normal advisers in the business. There is just one big caveat. Namely, only such a regulation really makes sense, which actually contributes to real policy influence disclosure and which all actors are willing to accept.

Only such a regulation really makes sense, which actually contributes to real policy influence disclosure and which all actors are willing to accept.

Three ways to regulate

Broadly speaking, there are three main traditions of lobbying regulation. The first is the Nordic option. In those societies, the regulation of lobbying has been debated at length, but the general consensus view is that regulating such activities is a threat to freedom of expression. Of course, this Nordic position should be seen in conjunction with the fact that the Nordic countries have the best perception of corruption in the world, i.e. that politics is conducted honestly in these societies and that there is a general perception that influencing politics can also be honest. We are talking here about societies in which it is believed that policy-making and the decisive influencing of policy must not only be honest, but also appear to be transparent.

Central European countries are generally classified in the second group. There, the picture of lobby regulation is relatively mixed. Classical lobbying regulation exists only in France and Austria, with self-regulation being the main feature.

Eastern Europe leads the way in regulating lobbying, with rigidly written lobbying regulations in Lithuania, Slovenia and Poland. In the case of Lithuania, for example, this also has a very specific background. Lithuania’s main obstacle in the European Union accession negotiations at the time was the great challenge of fighting corruption, and it was then that American consultants were recommended to Lithuania, and they wrote an American-style lobbying regulation for Lithuania, with accredited lobbyists who have to pass security clearance, rigid reporting, etc., as is the custom in Washington. The lobbying background in Poland is similar. The experience in Eastern Europe speaks of the way in which general misbehaviour is attempted to be tackled through excessive regulation.

All in all, so-called very rigid lobbying laws have been adopted in six EU Member States (as of 2018 – ed.). Ten countries have so-called soft regulations, which mainly means self-regulation on the part of advisers. In the remaining EU Member States, there is no self-regulation, no national regulation and no lobby register. These include, for example, Estonia*, Finland, Latvia, Denmark, and Sweden.

Lobbying depends on cultural background

There is a general consensus that illegal influence on politics, or various forms of corrupt practices, are largely cultural phenomena in nature and background. In the United States, for example, the regulation of lobbying has been an ongoing issue for the last 100 years. The first lobbying regulation, or law, in the United States of America was passed as early as 1946. Since then, one of the themes of every federal election has been to improve lobbying regulation, to make it tougher, to make it more transparent, and so on. This law tries to regulate both the subjects of politics, i.e. the lobbyists and the lobbied, and the objects of politics, i.e. the question of who has the right to have a say and who does not on specific proposed laws or regulations.

The issue of lobbying rules was also on the agenda during the 2016 US presidential election. In January 2017, President Trump enacted a series of new lobbying rules, including a two-year period during which officials are prohibited from advising clients on the same issue on which they previously worked and a five-year ban on lobbying the same agency where they previously worked**.

It is a question of its own what we could achieve if we were to regulate government relations consultancy, or lobbying, in Estonia. As international practice shows, there is no point in going into this in a cavalry charge style. It is also questionable how effective such regulations would be at all. The relevant debate in Finland has come to the conclusion that in a society where real decisions are made in the sauna, registers and the like are of little use.

Greater order would be beneficial

Nonetheless, as a practitioner in the field, I concede that a move towards more order in the field could be a goal. Firstly, it is positive that the number of professional advisers in government relations has increased significantly over the years, which also means that horizontal quality control of the indusry is beginning to emerge. A couple of things could deserve a chance already in a purely symbolic sense.

Firstly, I think that a voluntary register in Parliament would be progressive in terms of political culture. The German experience, where such a register has existed on a voluntary basis since 1972, confirms this.

Secondly, some kind of operational restrictions could be considered for civil servants and politicians, so that they do not become advisers in certain areas immediately after leaving public office. This could also be something that has a practical dimension and would undoubtedly strengthen political culture. Above all, however, legal compliance and political culture are important.

* In spring 2021, Estonia adopted a good practice guideline for dealing with lobbyists. Among other things, it obliges ministries and public authorities to publish the meetings of ministers and senior officials with interest groups.

** Shortly before the end of his term, Trump repealed these rules.